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THE FEDERAL TORT CLAIMS ACT-
A SUBSTANTIVE SURVEY
Robert N. Jotnson*
F~ E enactment of the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA) on Au-
T1gst 2, 1946, provided the most comprehensive waiver of sovereign
immunity encountered in the Federal Claims System.' Subject to several
exceptions and limitations,2 the provisions of FTCA3 provide for:
a. The payment of money damages, 4
b. For injury or loss of property; either real or personal, or for
personal injury or death,5
c. Caused by the negligent or wrongful act or omission,,
d. Of any employee of the Government,'
e. Acting within the scope of his office or employment,8
* Member of the Virginia Bar. B.S., United States Military Academy at West Point,
1960; J.D., T. C. Williams School of Law, 1966.
1 Actually, there are more than forty statutes which provide a remedy for the tortious
conduct of an employee of the United States. Only the FTCA is examined here as it is
the basic remedy against the sovereign for tort.
2 See 28 U.S.C. § 2680 (1970).
3 Because the provisions of the FTCA are scattered throughout various sections of the
United States Code, the sections comprising the Act are for convenience assembled in
this footnote: 22 U.S.C. § 2504(h) (1970) (Tort claims of Peace Corps volunteers);
28 U.S.C. § 1291 (1970) (Appeal from final decision of district court); 28 U.S.C. § 1346
(1970) (Juridiction of district court when United States is defendant); 28 U.S.C. § 1402
(1970) (Venue when United States is defendant); 28 U.S.C. § 1504 (1970) (Appeal to
Court of Claims); 28 U.S.C. § 2110 (1970) (Time for appeal to Court of Claims in tort
claims cases); 28 U.S.C. § 2401 (1970) (Time for commencing action against United
States); 28 U.S.C. § 2402 (1970) (Jury trial in actions against United States); 28
U.S.C. § 2411 (1970) (Interest); 28 U.S.C. § 2412 (1970) (Costs); 28 U.S.C. § 2414
(1970) (Payment of judgments and compromise settlements); 28 U.S.C. § 2671 (1970)
(Definitions); 28 U.S.C. § 2672 (1970) (Administrative adjustment of claims of $2,500
or less); 28 U.S.C. § 2674 (1970) (Liability of United States); 28 U.S.C. § 2675 (1970)
(Disposition by federal agency as prerequisite; evidence); 28 U.S.C. § 2676 (1970)
(Judgment as bar); 28 U.S.C. § 2677 (1970) (Compromise); 28 U.S.C. § 2678 (1970)
(Attorney fees; penalty); 28 U.S.C. § 2679 (1970) (Exclusiveness of remedy); 28 U.S.C.
§ 2680 (1970) (Exceptions).
4See 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b) (1970).
5Id.
61d.
7 id.
81d.
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f. Under circumstances where the United States, if a private person,
would be liable,9
g. In accordance with the law of the place where the act or omission
occurred.' 0
In this article the various sections of the United States Code will be
dealt with in the most general manner along with a small portion of the
decisional law within the framework of the most common issues en-
countered under FTCA. The sole object is to provide a starting point
for the practitioner's research.
I. PROPER CLAIMANTS
The provisions of FTCA are silent concerning the identity of proper
party claimants. Therefore, it might erroneously be assumed that any
person can sue the United States under FTCA for the negligent acts
or omissions of its employees provided his claim is otherwise covered
by the Act. However, through judicial construction certain classes of
claimants have been excluded from the Act's coverage. In this section,
the identity of certain individuals who may find themselves excluded
from the Act's coverage will be explored with emphasis on the factors
which affect or limit their right to sue.
A. Active Duty Military Personnel
There is no express exclusion of or limitation on the claims of
servicemen under the Act; in fact, there is no mention of service mem-
bers except as they are included among the possible tortfeasor employees
for whose negligence or wrongful acts or omissions the United States
is liable." The Supreme Court of the United States, shortly after FTCA
became law, considered the question in Brooks v. United States'2
whether servicemen are barred from recovery under FTCA.
In Brooks the Supreme Court held that servicemen are not barred
from recovery under the Act for injuries which have no relationship
to their military service, i.e., not "incident to service." Two service-
men on leave from their military installation and in a no-duty status
at the time of their collision with a Government driver on an off-post
9 Id.
10 I.
11 See 28 U.S.C. § 2671 (1970).
12 337 U.S. 49 (1949).
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public highway were respectively injured and killed. The fact that
the servicemen were entitled to compensation, disability, and gratuity
payments from the United States did not bar their recovery under the
Act. However, the value of the benefits received reduced the amount
recovered. The Court expressly reserved opinion upon whether the
result would be the same if a serviceman sustained death or injuries as
an incident to his service.13
That very issue, however, was promptly presented in Feres v. United
States,14 a case consolidating three separate actions under FTCA. In
Feres'5 an Army officer was burned to death while sleeping in his regu-
larly assigned barracks located on the military installation. The fire was
allegedly caused by the negligent maintenance of a defective heating
unit and the negligence of a military fire guard. In Griggs,' a Lieutenant
Colonel met his death allegedly due to medical malpractice in an Army
hospital. In Jefferson17 an Army surgeon negligently left an eighteen
by thirty inch towel with the words "Medical Department U.S. Army"
thereon in a serviceman's abdomen after an operation. Months after
the surgery and subsequent to his discharge the towel was discovered
and removed. In all of these consolidated cases the Supreme Court
ruled that the claimants could not maintain suit under FTCA for their
injuries or death sustained "incident to their service."
The Court stated four reasons for its decision:
(1) There is no private liability in like circumstances to which the
Feres situations could be analogized.
(2) Military discipline would be disrupted if one serviceman were
permitted to recover for injury or loss incident to service caused by the
negligence of another serviceman.
(3) Claims incident to service should be determined by Federal law
rather than by local law because of the relationship between servicemen
and the Government.
(4) A "simple, certain, uniform system of compensation" is avail-
13 "Were the accident incident to the Brooks' service, a wholly different case would
be presented. We express no opinion as to it . .. ." Brooks v. United States, 337
U.S. 49, 52 (1949).
14340 U.S. 135 (1950).
15 Feres v. United States, 177 F.2d 535 (2d Cir. 1949).
16Griggs v. United States, 178 F.2d 1 (10th Cir. 1950).
17 Jefferson v. United States, 178 F.2d 518 (4th Cir. 1949).
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able to servicemen, their dependents or survivors for losses incident to
service.
The private person analogy is probably not significant. To state that
no private person runs an Army; therefore, there should be no liability,
makes no sense when other analogies could more sensibly be made.
Private persons may be liable for medical malpractice or the negligent
maintenance of defective heating units.
It would appear to be more disruptive of discipline if a serviceman
were not permitted to recover for the tortious conduct of another mili-
tary member, particularly when injured by another service member in
a situation that would not have occurred if the claimant had not been
on active duty.
The servicemen in the Brooks case had the same simple, certain, uni-
form system of compensation available to the claimants in Feres, yet it
was no barrier to recovery under the Act in that case.
The unique relationship between the serviceman and the Govern-
ment seems to be all that is valid in the Feres rationale.
The "incident to service" rule as expressed by the Supreme Court's
language, "where the injuries arise out of or are in the course of activity
incident to service," I makes the test extremely difficult to apply when
a serviceman is injured in a situation other than actual performance of
duty. Tort recovery for a serviceman on pass returning to the base by
automobile to report for duty has been allowed under the Brooks
rationale,19 but another tort claim by a serviceman on leave returning
from Germany to the United States on a space available basis was dis-
allowed as occurring incident to service under the Feres doctrine.1°
A serviceman, who was qualified for military service despite a disquali-
fying heart ailment, was forced to participate in rigid training which
aggravated his condition. Although the training caused his subsequent
hospitalization and discharge, the serviceman was denied recovery. 21
A naval reservist enlisted man, ordered to active duty for one day to
18 See Feres v. United States, 340 U.S. 135, 146 (1950).
19 See Knecht v. United States, 144 F. Supp. 786 (E.D. Pa. 1956), affd, 242 F.2d 929
(3d Cir. 1957). See also Rich v. United States, 144 F. Supp. 791 (E.D. Pa. 1956); Barnes
v. United States, 103 F. Supp. 51 (W.D. Ky. 1952).
2
o See Fass v. United States, 191 F. Supp. 367 (E.D.N.Y. 1961).
21 See Healy v. United States, 192 F. Supp. 325 (S.D.N.Y. 1961), aff'd, 295 F.2d 958
(2d Cir. 1961).
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report for his physical examination, was barred by the rule of Feres
when his left ear was punctured by a negligent corpsman.'
Whether the practitioner's particular case falls under the Brooks or
the Feres doctrine will often be difficut to determine. However, it can
be stated with certainty that the United States will not be liable for
the negligent acts or omissions of its employees which arise out of or in
the course of activities incident to the serviceman's military service.
B. National Guard Personnel
The National Guard is both a reserve component of the United States
Army and an important part of the state militia. Because of the dual
character of the National Guard and the lack of case law, the circum-
stances under which the members thereof may recover under FTCA
for injuries or loss caused by other federal employees is unclear.
National Guard members injured in activity not incident to their
service as Guardsmen would in all probability not be barred from recov-
ery under the Act under the rationale of the Brooks case. On the other
hand, Guardsmen whose units have been activated into federal service
should not be expected to recover for injuries or losses arising incident
to their service because of the guidelines laid down in Feres. However,
the difficult situation is when a Guardsman sustains injury or loss inci-
dent to his service as a Guardsman when his unit has not been activated
into federal service. In Layne v. United States,23 a Guardsman whose
unit had not been activated into active federal service was killed in
the crash of a plane owned by the United States but used by his unit.
The claim was barred under the Feres doctrine because the accident
arose out of his dual capacity with the United States and his home state,
therefore, incident to his service. In the only other case in point, Colleta
v. United States,2 4 the court applied Feres and denied a Guardsman
recovery when he was injured on the firing range during a fifteen day
training period.
C. Civilian Employees
Compensatory benefits, similar to the more familiar benefits under
Workmen's Compensation, are provided by the Federal Employees'
Compensation Act (FECA), to be paid from appropriated funds, for
22 See Knoch v. United States, 316 F.2d 532 (9th Cir. 1963).
23 295 F.2d 433 (7th Cir. 1961), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 990 (1962).
24300 F. Supp. 19 (D.R.1. 1969).
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the death or disability of a civilian federal employee resulting from in-
juries sustained while in the performance of his duty.2 FECA provides
for the exclusive liability of the Government and its instrumentalities
to a federal employee injured in the course of his employment" If the
claim of a federal employee is compensable under FECA, that Act's
benefits are the sole remedy and no recovery may be obtained under
FTCA. However, the exclusive remedy provision of FECA does not
apply to property damage claims as their coverage is excluded from the
Act. Therefore, recovery may be had under FTCA for the property
damage of a civilian employee sustained while in the performance of
duty 27
The compensation statute governing nonappropriated funds pro-
vides employees specific exclusive benefits, similar to FECA, for death
or personal injury,28 but affords no benefits for property loss.
D. Other Parties
Although most common issues encountered under FTCA concern-
ing proper parties plaintiff involve civilian employees, military members,
and National Guardsmen, other exclusions and limitations have occa-
sionally arisen. Members of the Civil Air Patrol,30 Reserve Officers'
Training Corps,31 and District of Columbia employees 32 compensated
by FECA have been held not entitled to sue the United States under
FTCA. However, recovery has been permitted under FTCA to aliens,33
infants,3 4 corporations, 35 Indians,38 and veterans.3 7
25 See 5 U.S.C. § 8102(a) (1970).
26See 5 U.S.C. S 8116(c) (1970).
27 See GiUiam v. United States, 407 F.2d 818 (6th Cir. 1969).
28 See United States v. Forfari, 268 F.2d 29 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 361 U.S. 902 (1959).
2 9 See 5 U.S.C. §§ 8171-73 (1970).
30 See 5 U.S.C. § 803 (1970).
31 See Cobb v. United States, 81 F. Supp. 9 (W.D. La. 1948). See also 5 U.S.C
§ 802(a) (1970).
32 See 5 U.S.C. § 751 (1970).
33 See United States v. South Carolina State Highway Dep't, 171 F2d 893 (4th Cir.
1948).
34 See Baker v. United States, 226 F. Supp. 129 (S.D. Iowa 1964), aff'd, 343 F.2d 222
(8th Cir. 1965).
35 See Indian Towing Co. v. United States, 350 U.S. 61 (1955).
36 See Hatahley v. United States, 351 U.S. 173 (1956).
37 See United States v. Brown, 348 U.S. 110 (1954).
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II. ADMINISTRATIVE SUBMISSION OF CLAIMS
AND THE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS
An absolute condition precedent to the institution of an FTCA suit
in a federal district court is the administrative submission by the claim-
ant of his tort claim in writing to the appropriate federal agency.38 The
opportunity must be afforded the United States to settle the claim ad-
ministratively without suit. Failure to do so is jurisdictional.
The period for filing an administrative claim is within two years
after the claim accrues.39 A second condition precedent to the filing of
suit, after the administrative submission of a claim within the two year
period, is a denial of that claim by the federal agency to which the
claim was submitted.40
A denial may occur in one of three ways:
(1) The claim may be disapproved in writing by the agency to
which it was presented and sent by registered or certified mail to the
claimant.41
(2) The federal agency to which the claim was submitted may make
an offer to the claimant less than the amount claimed.
(3) Inaction by the federal agency for a period of six months; the
failure of the agency to finally dispose of the claim within six months
after it is filed may be deemed, at the option of the claimant, a construc-
tive denial for the purpose of permitting suit.42
Once the claim is administratively filed within the two year period
and the federal agency denies the claim, suit must be commenced in
the federal district court within six months after that denial.4 3
A claim may be time-barred before two years after it accrues. If a
claimant presents his claim for administrative consideration seven months
after it accrues, and it is denied four months thereafter, it will be time-
barred six months later, or seventeen months after it accrues. Also, the
time period for filing suit may extend well beyond the two year period.
If a claimant presents his claim for administrative consideration twenty-
38See 28 U.S.C. § 2401(b) (1970).
39 ld. Although federal law determines the period for filing an administrative claim,
state law is determinative of the cause of action and when the time begins to run.
,O Id.
41 Id.
42 See 28 U.S.C. § 675 (1970).
43 See 28 U.S.C. § 2401 (b) (1970).
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three months after it accrues, and it is denied six months thereafter, it
will be time-barred six months later, or thirty-five months after it
accrues.
The practitioner must be cautioned that the amount recoverable may
not exceed the amount for which the claim was first administratively
presented except on proof of newly discovered evidence, or of inter-
vening facts relating to the amount of the claim.
44
III. TERRITORIAL APPLICATION
The Act excludes "[a] ny claim arising in a foreign country." '1 Con-
siderable litigation has evolved from this apparently clear exclusion. In
United States v. Spelar,46 a claim arising from a plane accident at an Air
Force base in Newfoundland leased by the United States for a period of
99 years was barred by the foreign country exclusion. Even though the
Supreme Court had previously held the base was a possession of the
United States for purposes of the Fair Labor Standards Act, it decided
that the area was a "foreign country" for FTCA purposes and that
federal tort liability did not arise therein. The Court measured the
foreign country exclusion by two tests: (1) Newfoundland was a for-
eign sovereign in the international law sense, and (2) the governing
substantive tort law was foreign in source. The court in Burna v. United
State4 7 barred a claim arising in Okinawa after the signing of the peace
treaty with Japan, although the treaty conferred authority over Oki-
nawa upon the United States. It was suggested that the reasons stated by
the Supreme Court in Spelar may not be the only ones that influenced
Congress to exclude claims arising in a foreign country. The Court sug-
gested that the absence of United States courts in Okinawa, the prob-
lems of venue, and the difficulty of transporting witnesses were among
the factors considered in applying the foreign country exclusion. The
exclusion also barred a claim arising on the premises of the American
Embassy in Bangkok, Thailand. 48 A passenger on an Air Force plane,
44 See Huber v. United States, 244 F. Supp. 537 (ND. Cal. 1965). In this case, the
claimant suffered both property damage and personal injury. The claim was for property
damage only and the form stated that he was still under the doctor's care for his
personal injuries. He accepted the amount asked for as property damage. The United
States was granted summary judgment on his subsequent claim for personal injury.
45 See 28 U.S.C. § 2680(k) (1970).
46 338 U.S. 217 (1949).
47 142 F. Supp. 623 (E.D. Va. 1956), aff'd, 240 F.2d 720 (4th Cir. 1957).
48 See Meredith v. United States, 330 F.2d 9 (9th Cir. 1964).
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who sustained a permanent loss of hearing and speech when his plane
was negligently flown at an altitude above reasonably safe limits on a
flight from Saudi Arabia to Eritrea, was denied recovery based upon
the exclusion. °
It is suggested that the same area might be considered domestic for
some purposes and foreign for purposes of federal tort claims. The
test is whether the area is foreign in the international law sense; if so,
the United States has not waived its immunity from suit in that foreign
country.
IV. COGNIZABLE CLAIMS
Claims cognizable under FTCA extend only to the loss of real and
personal property, personal injury, and death.50 The law of the place
where the act or omission occurred determines the liability of the United
States."' If the law of that State does not classify certain acts or omis-
sions as a tort, the United States is not liable for those acts or omissions
of its employees.2
V. TORTFEASORS
Tortfeasors for whose conduct the United States is liable are defined
by statute as "any employee of the Government ... acting within the
scope of his office or employment ... ." " An employee of the govern-
ment "includes officers or employees of any federal agency, members
of the military or naval forces of the United States, and persons acting
on behalf of a federal agency in an official capacity, temporarily or
permanently in the service of the United States, whether with or with-
out compensation." 54 It should be noted that FTCA specifically ex-
cludes "any contractor with the United States" from the definition of
federal agency."9
Although FTCA appears to be explicit in defining those persons for
whose conduct the United States is liable, a bulk of litigation has arisen
concerning the specific exclusion of "any contractor with the United
States" from the definition of the term "federal agency." Judicial de-
49 See Pignataro v. United States, 172 F. Supp. 151 (E.D.N.Y. 1959).
5o See 28 U.S.C. § 1346 (1970).
61Id.
52 See Myers v. United States, 323 F.2d 580 (9th Cir. 1963).
53 See 28 U.S.C. § 1346 (1970).
54 See 28 U.S.C. § 2671 (1970).
55 Id.
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cisions have interpreted the exclusion to mean that the term "federal
agency" does not include "any independent contractor" with the United
States. Therefore, any independent contractor with the United States
is not an employee for whose negligent act or omission the Govern-
ment is liable.
Courts have incorporated into FTCA much of the law of agency
concerning the liability of the employer of an independent contractor
for the torts of that contractor. A suit against the United States for the
death of a contractor's employee killed during the manufacture of a
solid fuel propellant in the contractor's plant was dismissed.w In An-
derson v. United States, 7 a government contract directed the contrac-
tor to dump mud and silt on the claimant's realty. The contractor per-
formed according to the terms of the agreement. The Government was
liable for trespass. Liability arose not from the manner in which the
work was done, but because of the nature of the thing contracted to be
done.
The United States may also be liable for the acts or omissions of an
independent contractor while he is performing an inherently dangerous
activity which could reasonably have been anticipated.6 8 In Maloof v.
United States,-0 the United States contracted to have a road built. The
government reserved the power to control certain details of the opera-
tion, including the size of the fires, whether or not to suspend burning,
and the use of safety equipment. After the claimant's property was
destroyed by fire, the court held that although the contractor was an
independent contractor with respect to the job as a whole, he was not
an independent contractor as to the aspect of the work which caused
the damage. Therefore, the United States was liable.
VI. SCOPE OF EMPLOYMENT
Under FTCA, to impose liability upon the United States for his
negligent acts or omissions, an employee of the Government must be
acting on behalf of a federal agency and within the scope of his office
or employment. The applicable section of FTCA 0 states that "acting
within the scope of his office or employment," in the case of a member
56 See United States v. Page, 350 F.2d 28 (10th Cir. 1965).
57 259 F. Supp. 148 (E.D. Pa. 1966).
58 See Stancil v. United States, 196 F. Supp. 478 (E.D. Va. 1961).
59 242 F. Supp. 175 (D. Md. 1965).
60 28 U.S.C. § 2671 (1970).
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of the military or naval forces of the United States, means acting in the
line of duty. However, the Supreme Court in Williams v. United
States61 held that the reference to "line of duty" for military or naval
members has the same meaning as scope of employment. The Court
also held that the scope of employment is to be determined by the law
of the place where the act or omission occurred.
In Mider v. United States,62 a motorpool sergeant issued himself a
trip-ticket for one of the motorpool vehicles. While he and another
soldier were on a drinking tour, they were involved in an accident. The
United States was subsequently sued for the negligent acts of its em-
ployees. Overruling the district court, the circuit court held that al-
though the sergeant had authority to dispatch the vehicle as part of his
normal employment, he did not have authority to dispatch the vehicle
to himself for the purpose of touring the bars. Therefore, he was not
within the scope of his employment and no liability was imposed upon
the United States. Inherent in any court's determination of whether
the conduct of a federal employee is within the scope of his employ-
ment, is the degree to which the purposes of the United States are being
served at the time of the incident and the amount of control exercised
by the United States over that employee.
Some difficult issues concerning scope of employment have arisen in
cases involving military members on temporary duty travel or perma-
nent change of station travel. Judgment for the plaintiff was granted
in Myers v. United States, when the claimant's automobile was struck
by a member of the Air Force who was driving his privately owned
automobile in a negligent manner. The tortfeasor was authorized to
travel on his temporary duty in his privately owned vehicle and was
carrying military equipment to his new temporary duty station. The
court held that the scope of employment was determined by the law of
Colorado.
The cases generally hold that service members travelling to tempo-
rary duty stations are in the scope of their employment for purposes
of imposing FTCA liability upon the United States. However, the
decisions are not so consistent when the military member is involved
in a permanent change of station travel. In Kunkler v. United States,6
61350 U.S. 857 (1955).
62322 F.2d 193 (6th Cir. 1963).
63 219 F. Supp. 71 (W.D. Mo. 1963).
64 295 F.2d 370 (5th Cir. 1961).
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an airman was to move from his permanent station in Mississippi to
another permanent station in Alabama. However, he was granted an
official delay enroute and permitted to take leave before reporting to
his new duty station. He travelled from Mississippi to Vermont and
from Vermont back to Florida for a visit. While enroute from Florida
to Alabama, still in the Florida vicinity, he operated his vehicle in a
negligent manner and was involved in an accident. The court held that
because his deviation as to time and distance was more than slight he
was not within the scope of his employment. Therefore, the United
states was not liable for his acts.
To be compared with Kunkler is United States v. Culp. 5 In that case
a serviceman involved in an accident caused by his own negligence was
held to be within the scope of his employment. The basis of the court's
decision was the fact that the service member was traveling pursuant
to permanent change of station orders and would subsequently receive
a travel allowance for his trip. Although Culp seems to be in conflict
with Kunkler, there was no deviation as to time and distance by the
service member in Culp.
In Witt v. United States,66 it was held that when under state law an
employer is not liable if an employee serves his own interests, a federal
employee is not within the scope of his employment for purposes of
FTCA liability when he serves his own purposes rather than those of
the government. In Witt two servicemen were flying an airplane from
Colorado to Washington state. After completion of their mission they
decided not to return immediately to their home station. Instead, they
flew to Oregon to visit the family of one of the servicemen. While in
Oregon, they were practicing touch and go flights for training purposes.
During these flights in the vicinity of a mink farm, damage was caused
to the farmer's mink. The court held that the two servicemen were
outside the scope of their employment and judgment was awarded the
defendant. Under Oregon law an employer is not held responsible when
an employee serves his own interests.
FTCA applies only to those torts that are caused by a federal em-
ployee while acting within the scope of his employment or office. Scope
of employment is determined by the local rules of respondeat superior.
Counsel preparing an FTCA case must be aware of the law of the place
of the act or omission for the following issues in determining whether
65 346 F.2d 35 (5th Cir. 1965).
66 319 F.2d 704 (9th Cir. 1963).
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an employee is within the scope of his employment: (1) the control to
be exercised by the master over the employee before it can be stated
with certainty that the employee is within the scope of his employment;
(2) the degree to which the master's purposes are being served at the
time of the act or omission; (3) whether an employee has the power by
his own acts to place himself within the scope of his employment; (4)
whether an employee is within the scope of his employment when he
serves his own purposes in addition to those of his master; (5) what
deviations are necessary to remove the conduct of the employee from
within the scope of his employment; and (6) when an employee's devi-
ation is so substantial that he is placed outside the scope of his employ-
ment, regardless of whether that employee has returned to the purposes
of his employer at the time of the act or omission.
VII. THE LAW OF THE PLACE OF THE ACT OR OMISSION
An essential element of FTCA is that the United States shall be liable
in accordance with the law of the place where the negligent or wrong-
ful act or omission occurred. It therefore becomes imperative to discuss
the applicable law when the act or omission occurs in an area under
federal jurisdiction, whether exclusive or concurrent, or in an area over
which the United States either possesses only a proprietorial interest or
no federal jurisdiction of any form.
When a federal employee's tortious activity occurs in an area under
exclusive jurisdiction of the United States, the state law as of the time
the federal government acquired jurisdiction is applicable, 67 unless that
law has been later modified by a federal statute. In Arlington Hotel Co.
v. Fant,s the personal property of guests lodging in a hotel in a national
park was destroyed by fire. At the time the United States acquired
exclusive jurisdiction over the national park, the law made the innkeeper
an absolute insurer of his guest's property in the event of fire. Subse-
quently, the legislature of the state in which the national park was
located relieved the innkeepers of that liability. The Supreme Court
granted judgment in favor of the plaintiff, stating that the determination
of property damage was governed by the law of the state when juris-
diction was granted to the federal government.
Even today a claim for property damage arising in an area under
exclusive federal jurisdiction is governed by the law of the surrounding
67 See Arlington Hotel Co. v. Fant, 278 U.S. 439 (1929).
68 Id.
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state at the time the United States acquired its exclusive jurisdiction.
But in accordance with the exception to the rule, a federal statute69
has changed the applicable law in personal injury and wrongful death
claims arising in areas under exclusive federal jurisdiction. This section
of the Conservation Act, in federal enclaves over which the United
States has exclusive jurisdiction, has rendered applicable the current
law of the state as to wrongful death and personal injury claims. There-
fore, the courts are faced with the unique situation that personal injury
and wrongful death claims occurring in areas under exclusive federal
jurisdiction are governed by the current surrounding state law while
claims for property damage occurring in that same area are governed
by the surrounding state law at the time the United States acquired
exclusive jurisdiction.
When the United States possesses an interest in an area other than
exclusive federal jurisdiction, such as a proprietorial interest or con-
current jurisdiction, the current surrounding state law applies to per-
sonal injury, wrongful death, and property damage claims.
When the tortious conduct of a federal employee occurs in an area
within the state not under federal jurisdiction of any kind, the liability
of the United States is to be measured by the law of the place where
the act or omission occurred. Richards v. United States-, is the classic
case in point. In that instance an airplane crashed in Missouri which had
a wrongful death limit of $35,000. It was determined that the negligent
acts or omissions which caused the crash in Missouri took place in
Oklahoma. In Oklahoma there was no limit as to the amount recover-
able in a wrongful death action. The Court was faced with the task
of reconciling two separate elements of FTCA: the law of the place
of the negligent act or omission, and the proposition that the United
States was to be liable as any individual would be under like circum-
stances. The Court decided to apply the law of the place of the negli-
gent conduct. However, it determined that the whole law of that place
must be applied, and under the Oklahoma law of conflicts, the matter
was referred to Missouri law. Therefore, the wrongful death limit of
$35,000 was held applicable in this case.
VIII. EXCEPTIONS TO LIABILITY
If the particular facts of an FTCA case fall within any of the numer-
69 See Conservation Act, 16 U.S.C. § 457 (1970).
70 369 U.S. 1 (1962).
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ous exceptions listed under the Act,7 ' then no liability is imposed upon
the United States. Only two of the exceptions are discussed in this
article because almost all judicial decisions affecting any of the excep-
tions to FTCA liability involve those discussed herein.
The United States is not responsible for "[a]ny claim arising out of
assault, battery, false imprisonment, false arrest, malicious prosecution,
abuse of process, libel, slander, misrepresentation, deceit, or interfer-
ence with contract rights." ' In United States v. Hambleton,7 3 a claim-
ant who suffered severe emotional distress after a prolonged interroga-
tion by a U.S. Army investigator was denied recovery under FTCA.
The court applied the assault exclusion, stating that mere words could
constitute an assault and therefore no responsibility existed on the part
of the United States. In Lane v. United States,"4 a surgeon operated
on his patient's knee, but unfortunately, he operated on the wrong one.
The court held the assault exclusion inapplicable and stated that it could
not be contended that the doctor intended to operate on the wrong
knee. Since there was no intentional wrong, there was no assault and
the plaintiff was granted recovery.
A most interesting set of facts was presented in Blitz v. Boog.7a The
claimant went to a Veterans Administration Hospital for out-patient
treatment to which she was entitled, but the hospital refused to accept
her as a veteran. The patient was immediately removed to a psychiatric
ward at Bellevue Hospital and subsequently suffered severe beating. Af-
ter eight days at Bellevue, the patient left and entered another Veterans
Hospital for treatment of her fever. Immediately she was put under
psychiatric care. When suit was brought by the claimant against the
United States for false imprisonment, the court held that the United
States was not liable because false imprisonment was one of the excepted
torts under FTCA.
In Gamage v. United States7 6 an officer who was ordered to report
to the post hospital by his commander for an automobile license exami-
nation was confined to the facility and subsequently retired for dis-
ability. His complaint against the United States was dismissed under
the wilfull tort exception. The court found that the facts constituted
71 See 28 U.S.C. § 2680 (1970).
72 See 28 U.S.C. § 2680(h) (1970).
73 185 F.2d 564 (9th Cir. 1950).
74 225 F. Supp. 850 (ED. Va. 1964).
75 328 F.2d 596 (2d Cir. 1964).
76 217 F. Supp. 381 (N.D. Cal. 1962).
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defamation, assault, battery, false imprisonment and deceit, all of which
are listed as exceptions under which no liability may be imposed upon
the United States.
Pendarvis v. United States7 7 carried the use of this exception one step
further. A farmer near a military installation had allowed his property
to be used for maneuvers. Some of the troops thought the farmer was
one of the aggressors participating in the war games. Failing to convince
the soldiers of his real identity, he was manhandled. There is no doubt
at this point, based upon the previously noted decisions, that the battery
and false imprisonment exceptions to FTCA liability would apply. How-
ever, after being beaten, the farmer was transported to the hospital at
the military installation where he became a victim of medical malprac-
tice. In a subsequent suit against the United States for medical mal-
practice, the court held that there was no liability for claims "arising
out of" the situations listed in the statute.
FTCA also prohibits "[a]ny . . . claim based upon the exercise or
performance or the failure to exercise or perform a discretionary func-
tion or duty, ... whether or not the discretion involved be abused." 7
Since discretionary acts are excepted from FTCA liability, it must be
determined what is a discretionary function or duty. In Coates v.
United States,79 through flood control and irrigation projects, the flow
of the Missouri River was negligently changed over a period of twenty
years. The plaintiff was denied recovery in a decision based upon the
discretionary function exception. It was held to be a discretionary func-
tion of the Congress whether to engage in flood control and irrigation
projects. However, in United States v. Hunsucker,8° the court failed to
apply the discretionary function exception when a hazard resulted from
negligence occurring at the operational level. In Hunsucker there was
damage to the claimant's land which adjoined a U.S. Air Force base.
The damage was caused by the installation of a drainage ditch and
sewage disposal system. The court held that although the decision
to activate the base occurred at the planning level, the negligence oc-
curred in the construction of the drainage ditch and sewage disposal
system at the operational level. Therefore, the discretionary function
exception did not apply and the United States was held liable.
77 241 F. Supp. 8 (E.D.S.C. 1965).
78 See 28 U.S.C. § 2680(a) (1970).
79 181 F.2d 816 (8th Cir. 1950).
80 314 F.2d 98 (9th Cir. 1962).
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In Schubert v. United States,8' the discretionary function exception
was applied and the case against the United States was dismissed. In that
case damage was caused to the plaintiff's property by the testing of jet
engines at a nearby naval air station facility. It appeared that the loca-
tion of the station and the decision to test jet engines there was a matter
of discretion. However, it is interesting to observe that had the damage
to plaintiff's property been caused by the negligent design of the sta-
tion or jet engines themselves, the negligence may have been considered
to have occurred at the operational rather than the policy level, and
consequently the discretionary function exception would not have
barred recovery. The problem, then, has evolved from determining
what is a discretionary function to applying the distinction between the
planning and operational levels in a close factual situation.
It should be noted that FTCA lists numerous other exceptions under
which no liability will be imposed upon the United States for the negli-
gent act or omissions of its employees. The practitioner should always
consult the statute to determine if his particular factual situation falls
within one of those exceptions.
IX. CONCLUSION
In this era of increased federal activity, when the United States Gov-
ernment owns and operates thousands of vehicles and other equipment
which could be involved in accidents, and employs hundreds of thou-
sands of military and civilian personnel for whose negligent acts or
omissions the United States might be liable, it is no wonder that the
incidence of federal tort claims is high.
As previously stated, the sole object of this article has been to famil-
iarize the practitioner with the general substantive law of the Federal
Tort Claims Act. It was meant to be only a general survey. The
statutes and the judicial decisions should be consulted for details. It is
hoped that this article will at least enable the reader to recognize that
he has or does not have a potential FTCA case.
81 246 F. Supp. 170 (S.D. Tex. 1965).
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